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PRACTICAL COMMITMENT TO RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT
Franklin Roosevelt was strongly influenced by the thought and practice of Woodrow Wilson, who is recognized as the first writer to advance the doctrine of responsible party government. In his later writings, particularly, Wilson stressed the importance of extending the influence of the presidency to facilitate responsible partisan politics. The separation and division of powers weakened somewhat the strength of the president as party leader. Yet the independence of the president from the Congress and his unique position within the political system imposed an "extraordinary isolation" on the president, which, if used effectively, established the chief executive as his party's "major link" with the nation.'?
To a degree, Roosevelt shared this vision. But his concerns were focused on practical rather than theoretical considerations. He did not consider a responsible party system to be an essential element of democratic government. Roosevelt did express some concern that the organized opposition to him in Congress was practically obliterated in the election of 1936. But as Turner Catledge suggested at the time, it was more than "mere good sportsmanship" or a "philosophical attitude toward opposition" that caused such regret. Roosevelt's concern for loyal opposition was dominated by practical considerations; without an organized opposition on which he could depend to oppose everything he advanced, Roosevelt would be beset by unorganized groups within his own party ranks, presenting an "undefinable and unpredictable collection of shifting blocs, the most annoying opposition with which any leader would have to deal.""
The work of Wilson and a few others notwithstanding, parties have never been defended on theoretical grounds in American democracy to the extent they have in Britain and most other industrial nations; they have rarely been viewed by political representatives as desirable ends-in-themselves. Still, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, they have been recognized by public officials as the most effective instruments of control within a fragmented power structure. For this reason, during times of political crisis, political leaders have sought to become, at least in part, party leaders.
Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt never developed a theory of the party system. But his concern with policy reform led him to try to circumvent the resistance he encountered from his party to a much greater degree than did Wilson. Up until the 1930s, the Democratic party remained committed to its Jeffersonian origins, that is individual autonomy, limited government, and states' rights. In fact, although Alexis de Tocqueville felt that equality required centralization of authority, American democracy had been allied to decentralization until the New Deal. Herbert Croly and Theodore Roosevelt had talked about "new nationalism" and the possibility of resurrecting Alexander Hamilton's nationalism as the "steward of the public welfare."'2 But prior to the New Deal, Democrats associated American liberalism with its Jeffersonian origins, which identified positive government with conservative efforts, beginning with Hamilton's economic policy, to promote business enterprises. Even Woodrow Wilson's program of extending the role of the national government remained committed to individual autonomy from the authority of the central government. Wilson's administration intervened to protect women and child workers, and the Federal Trade Commission was established to prevent unfair and deceptive business practices. But progressive Democrats, as Richard Hofstadter suggests, "preferred to keep the positive functions of government minimal, and, where these were necessary, to keep them on the state rather than the national level."'3 Previous great reform movements in the United States can be seen as reaffirmations of the American tradition of limited constitutional government, but the New Deal, though certainly not a direct rejection of this tradition, most seriously questioned the adequacy of traditional American freedoms.
One significant manifestation of Roosevelt's "new liberalism" was his assault on traditional party politics, a significant watershed in presidential party leadership. Wilson was a strong party leader but, like all previous presidents, he reconciled himself in the last analysis to the strong fissures within his party. In his use of patronage particularly, Wilson pursued a' strategy directed at controlling rather than reforming his party in order to get his programs passed. Consequently, Wilson made little effort to strengthen the Democratic party's organization or its fundamental commitment to progressive principles. ' power.17 But FDR's actions to establish a "personal party" can probably be better understood if they are viewed as part of an effort to alter the character of constitutional government in the United States. As early as 1933, in a speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, he argued that where once equality of opportunity was provided by limited government interference in society and expansion in the American economy, certain economic and social changes in the American system demanded that Americans now recognize the "new terms of the old social contract."'8 The closing of the Western frontiers and the growth of industrial combinations to the point of "uncontrolled" and "irresponsible" units within the state signaled the turning of the tide by the end of the nineteenth century. The Depression of the 1930's, argued Roosevelt, indicated all too clearly that government action on behalf of the people was long overdue:
Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of national resources, or necessarily producing new goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has come.'9 Roosevelt indicated that the solution to America's problems would require, at minimum, the development of "an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order." This new constitutional order required that there be a change in the liberalism of the Democratic party. And this change could occur only with the extension of presidential power over the party. The New Dealers' attempt to make the party into a more national organization focused not only on the national committee, which was dominated by state and local party leaders, but also on Congress, which registered state and local interests at the national level. In the last analysis, Roosevelt believed that a more principled party politics could only come through the subordination of Congress's position in the development of party policy. Measures of such scope and complexity that he had in view could only be implemented if they were drawn under the strong hand of centralized control; the New Deal could not be planned and built by debate within the legislature and traditional party councils. The degree to which this action was viewed as a shocking departure from precedents in American politics is indicated by the fact that the press soon labeled Roosevelt's 1938 primary campaign as "the purge," a term which became 30 Roosevelt, Public Papes and Addresses, vol. 4, 337. Statements such as this were directed to nurturing a national consensus, which would establish a direct link between the President and a constitutency based less on partisan loyalty than government services. The basic thesis of this article, which suggests that New Deal partisan politics, though fervent, looked to a nonpartisan future, may explain why Roosevelt's statement that the presidency requires party leadership is qualified by the phrase, "for the time being." Although after 1800 the president became party leader as well as leader of all the people, the broad commitment in the United States to the separation of powers and federalism has disinclined the chief executive from connecting his ambition too centrally to his party in Congress. The traditional role of the presidency helps to explain Roosevelt's initial hesitancy to attempt to influence congressional contests, as well as the shock that greeted Roosevelt's eventual attempt to transform the Democratic party into a more liberal party. A close look at his actions against conservative Democrats reveals that these actions could achieve only an ephemeral strengthening of party government. This strategy reveals the short-sightedness of the Roosevelt administration and reflects the limited partisan purposes of the New Dealers in the first place. These purposes were most centrally focused on the South and local party organizations. This observation would seem to be supported by the fact that Roosevelt's one successful purge effort in congressional elections was accomplished against conservative Rules Committee Chairman John J. O'Connor from New York CityRoosevelt's only effort in the urban North.34 There were other factors that contributed to this victory besides the fact that it was carried out in a northern metropolitan area. Since Roosevelt received the support of the local party organization in this contest and New York was his home state, the charge of outside interference that was lodged against him in other primary contests was not effective in this race.35 Nevertheless, Roosevelt's effort to transform the Democratic party into a liberal party might have garnered more support had it been directed more aggressively at some of the more recalcitrant northern candidates. Successes in such an attempt might have sufficiently backed conservative southern Democrats into a corner where they either would have acquiesced to Roosevelt's liberal views or abandoned the Democratic party.
The Democratic
This northern strategy, however, would have relegated the Democratic party to being a sectional organization. Roosevelt probably recognized that writing off the South would lead to the development of a doctrinaire liberal party in the North. This would cause a sectional split that Roosevelt wanted to avoid. Heretofore the party had been a national party but at a price to its ability to coordinate policy action. The New Dealers wanted to nationalize the party system in a more fundamental way; they sought to transform a decentralized party, responsible only to a local electorate, into an organization responsive to the will of the national party leader-the President-and the interests of a national electorate.36 Roosevelt's appeal to the nation during the 1938 primary was an initial attempt to displace the local and sectional conflicts that were such an important part of the complex American political process in favor of a more nationalized political agenda based upon economic issues.37
With such a task in mind, the President initiated his southern campaign by visiting his "other home" in Warm Springs, Georgia in August 1938. Roosevelt endorsed United States Attorney Lawrence Camp in a speech at Barnsville, as Walter George listened from the same podium. The President began his talk by arguing that a positive national program of social welfare legislation would be of special benefit to the South, a region that was disproportionately plagued by economic and social problems. Yet effective action by the federal government, Roosevelt told Georgians, could only be achieved by a party of men who shared a truly "liberal" political philosophy, who were willing to engage the federal government in attending to the southern social and economic needs. This meant, said Roosevelt:
... that if the people of the State of Georgia want definite action in the Congress of the United States, they must send to that Congress Senators and Representatives who are willing to stand up and fight night and day for federal statutes drawn to meet actual needs -not something that serves merely to gloss over the evils of the moment for the time being-but laws with teeth in them which go to the root of the problems, which remove the inequities, raise the standards and, over a period of years, give constant improvement to the conditions of human life in this state.38 Roosevelt felt that the deep South would not have to be conceded by a liberalized Democratic party. Conservatism in the South was not really an economic conservatism. Conservative Democracy in this section of the country was firmly established in reaction to the populist movement at the end of the nineteenth century by the exploitation of the race issue. He believed that the people in the South could be persuaded of the advantages of a liberal Democratic party if the race issue and the reconstruction era could be forgotten amid a chorus of demands for economic justice-demands that would be important to the majority of whites as well as blacks. With this in mind, when Roosevelt was asked at a press conference in April 1938-at a time when the New Deal was besieged by the conservative coalition under the leadership of southern Democrats -whether he thought the solid South would stay Democratic very long, he replied: Let me put it this way. I think the South is going to remain Democratic but I think it is going to be a more intelligent form of democracy than has kept the South, for other reasons, in the democratic column all these years. It will be intelligent thinking and, in my judgment, because the South is learning, it is going to be a liberal democracy.39
The desire of the administration to focus on economic legislation probably contributed to Roosevelt's lukewarm support of the Antilynching Bill, which would have held local law enforcement authorities responsible for the lynching of prisoners "escaping" their custody. To southern Democrats, it appeared that Roosevelt was intent upon building a new party organization. Senator George was able to excite the fear in many old-time southerners in Georgia that the purge against him indicated that the advisers around the President-the Corcorans, the Cohens, the Hopkinses, who had no relationship to the regular Democratic organization-were influencing him toward the remodeling of their ancient and honorable party.44 The New Dealers, however, were less concerned with reforming traditional party politics than they were with overcoming obstacles to the development of a modern welfare state.
Party Organization -A Modern Tammany?
With the exception of the purge in New York City of John O'Connor, the administration eschewed working through traditional party machines in order to influence the election of a more tractable Congress. All of the members of the "elimination committee," which planned the purge campaign, came from outside the Democratic organization. Democratic Chairman James Farley, who was bitterly opposed to the primary campaign, became less influential once it was finally decided to attack the conservative wing of the party.
Roosevelt Roosevelt expressed hope that the American party system was changing from an institution based upon self-interest and pragmatism into one organized on the basis of principle. The lack of integrity of traditional party politics was not his only concern. His vision of a government more extensively committed to equality, redistribution, and the welfare state required more efficient administration. He expressed such a view in his 1935 speech to the Young Democratic Clubs:
Mere party membership and loyality can no longer be the exclusive test. We must be loyal not merely to persons or parties, but we must be loyal also to the higher conceptions of ability and devotion that modern government requires.47
But the New Dealers, their rhetoric notwithstanding, were quite willing to politicize federal administration. Oftentimes their strategy seemed to involve not so much a drive for the end of patronage as it did an attempt to centralize control of patronage within the presidency. As the President-elect, Roosevelt spoke of modifying rather than eliminating patronage practices. Feeling Wilson's adherence to traditional patronage practices was unfortunate, Roosevelt expressed to Homer Cummings in January 1933 his desire to proceed on somewhat different lines, primarily with the view, according to the latter's diary, "to building up a national organization rather than allowing patronage to be used merely to build Senatorial and Congressional machines."48 During his first term, This federal machine was much more successful in aiding the renomination of pro-New Deal incumbents than it was in "purging" New Deal opponents from the party. With the exception of the congressional primary in New York, which was fought on Roosevelt's home territory, every incumbent that was a target of the purge was able to fight off the challenge of Roosevelt's personality and federal pap. Nevertheless, the development of a New Deal machine was a frightening prospect even for rather well entrenched incumbents, since "purge" campaigns forced them to engage in long and costly campaigns which otherwise might be foregone conclusions.
The Hatch Act, however, made the full development of a national party machine based on federal government spending and organization less likely. It removed the influence of virtually all federal administrative officials from nominating or electioneering efforts for president, vice-president, or members of Congress.54 It also had strong legal measures that sought to prevent federal job holders from using their influence to coerce votes or money in national elections. Besides serving to further insulate congressional and Senate elections from presidential control, the Hatch Act also gave members of In spite of these efforts to develop a federal political organization, it is not likely that Roosevelt aimed to develop a national Tammany Hall. He was more interested in orienting the executive department for the formation of liberal public policy than he was in developing a national political machine. He recognized that to carry out his program the party organization would have to be based on principles as well as pap, and that the executive department needed to be professional as well as liberal. As E. E. Schattschneider wrote in reference to the Hatch Act, "a powerful national party organization is not merely a magnified local machine consuming a greater quantity of spoils."'56 This probably explains why after much consideration the President, though he fought passage of this legislation, chose not to veto the Hatch Act.57 Not only would such a veto most likely have split his party irretrievably and cost the Democrats votes in 1940, but it also would have worked against the achievement of Roosevelt's reform program. The creation of the modern welfare state required effective administration. The New Dealers did not seek to build an executive department which would be independent of political control; they wanted a bureaucracy that would be committed to the perpetuation of the New Deal. But the insulation of federal officials from patronage politics was not incompatible with such a task. The Hatch Act, though it might have weakened the attempt to "cleanse" the Democratic party, may have furthered the cause of the New Dealers to establish a modern welfare state.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF PARTISAN POLITICS
Roosevelt's purge campaign galvanized opposition throughout the nation. Roosevelt and the New Deal were very popular in the South in the 1930s, especially in Georgia; nevertheless, the attack on the southern incumbents was rejected as overzealous nationalism and partisanship. The major reason given for the failure of the purge campaigns was resentment at the President's interference in matters that were considered to be state and local. In the end, the President's attempt to affect state and local primary contests was viewed as an irresponsible effort to fashion a rubber stamp Congress. His failure demonstrated the strong resistance built into the American political culture against fervent national partisanship. The decentralized nature of the American party system has become attached to such constitutional mechanisms in American politics as the separation of powers and federalism, thereby making any direct attack on this system difficult. New York Times columnist Arthur Krock wrote after the failed primary campaign: Roosevelt was always aware of the limitations of the extent to which his purposes could be achieved by party government in the American context. He realized that while political exigency demanded that the president assume the leadership of his party, the full power and splendor of the office necessitated rising above partisan politics. This realization probably helps to explain why the purge campaign was limited to a few Senate and congressional contests, for the most part in the South, rather than a more systematic nationwide attempt to elect New Dealers. ican system, and that, effectively organized nationally and by States and by localities, parties are good instruments for the purpose of presenting and explaining issues, of drumming up interests in elections, and, incidentally, of improving the breed of candidates for public office.
A Party to End All
But the future lies with those wise political leaders who realize the great public is interested more in government than in politics, that the independent vote in this country has been steadily on the increase, at least for the past generation, that vast numbers of people consider themselves normally adherents of one party and still feel perfectly free to vote for one or more candidates of another party, come election day, and on the other hand, sometimes uphold party principles even when precinct captains decide "to take a walk."6' Roosevelt recognized during the 1930s realignment period that party influence might be waning, thereby anticipating the "decline of party" literature that began to appear during the 1960s. He perhaps believed that the resurgence of party politics during the New Deal was temporary. In part his realization may be attributable to the disappointing purge campaign, but apparently Roosevelt saw the handwriting on the wall prior to the partisan efforts of 1938. Beginning in 1937, Roosevelt sought administrative reforms that were intended to help him govern in the absence of party government.
Party responsibility and the development of the modern presidency became intermingled during the Roosevelt administration. Most obviously, the liberalization of the Democratic party under Roosevelt and the New Deal realignment led to the development of a modern welfare state and a transition from legislative to executive-oriented government. In addition, however, the Democratic party was to be used as a means to provide the president greater control over the welfare state so that the executive department would be a more independent policy maker than was hitherto possible. Roosevelt believed that liberalism could best be promoted in the long run through a revamping of the executive department which would eventually make traditional party politics less important. In a sense, this would also make the development of responsible party government less necessary. In the last analysis, New Deal reformers viewed the strengthening of presidential administration as better suited to obviating the obstacle of separation of powers than a revamped party system: whereas party government required the constant cooperation of party members in Congress, presidential administration would "only" require the passive acceptance of executive-initiated programs. As Luther Gulick, who played a pivotal role in new Deal administrative reform, put it, the legislature would merely respond positively or negatively to the master plan of policy worked out by the executive, a plan that, in effect would be little more than "a declaration of war, so that the essence of the program is in reality in the gradual unfolding of the plan in actual administration."63 Legislative acquiescence would certainly not be easy to achieve, yet administrative reform might so strengthen the presidency that executive domination of public policy would be difficult to resist.
Consequently The Democratic party became, during the 1930s, a temporary way station on the road to administrative government. Such an administrative party would establish the conditions for the end of parties, unless an anti-administration challenging party would spring up. It is primarily in this capacity that the Republican party has provided "loyal opposition" since the New Deal.
The civil service reform carried out by the Roosevelt administration demonstrates particularly the effort to replace "politics" with "administration." Unlike most of the elements of administrative reform that would strengthen the President per se, the extension of the merit system "upward, outward and downward" cast an especially New Deal hue over government machinery. This entailed extending merit protection after 1938 over the personnel appointed by the Roosevelt administration during its first term; four-fifths of these had been brought into government outside of regular merit channels.7' Administrative reform, therefore, was pursued in a way to politicize, rather than simply professionalize, the bureaucracy, albeit in a nonpartisan way. This would especially strengthen the hand of presidents sympathetic to the political objectives of the New Deal.
The New Deal Realignment and the Decline of Parties
The creation of the modern presidency and the consequent de-emphasis on party leadership during the New Deal has had an important influence on the historical development of the party system. Roosevelt's party politics, which led to a significant transcendence of partisan politics, ultimately weakened the influence of the party system on public policy. This outcome of the New Deal is often overlooked. Although historical treatments of the party system usually relate the decline of political parties during the twentieth century, such treatments usually consider the important events surrounding the Depression as a dramatic but brief positive interlude in a long period of party decay. But the outcome of the New Deal realignment -the establishment of presidential government and the rejection of traditional partisan politics as archaic-suggests that the "end-ofparty" literature has underestimated the "positive" contributions of the New Deal in accelerating party decomposition.
Presidential Johnson's neglect of party affairs represented the continuation of the conflict between the decentralized American party system and the centralization of political power which has become increasingly significant throughout the twentieth century. The demand for stronger national leadership has been stimulated especially by the pursuit of reform represented by the New Deal and the Great Society. Presidential leadership became increasingly salient with the rise of the welfare state, and the greater focus on the presidency has encouraged presidents to look beyond the party system toward a politics of, as Roosevelt put it in his 1933 Commonwealth Speech, "enlightened administration." Franklin Roosevelt's illfated efforts to guide the affairs of his party were well and often remembered by Lyndon Johnson,76 and, therefore, his attempt to extend the national purpose of the New Deal focused on the politics of presidential administration.
CONCLUSION: TlE FUTURE CONNECTION BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND PARTIES
As the consensus for liberal programs has cooled during the last decade, the effective political direction once provided by the public philosophy of the New Deal and presidential leadership no longer seems possible. However, bureaucratic agencies set in place by the Roosevelt and Johnson administrations have continued to set policy along the line envisioned by New Deal liberalism, although this policy has lost its connection to a governing coalition. The political control once provided by political parties for facilitating consensus and redirecting policy is a thing of the past. And the modern presidency, which was developed to alleviate the need for parties and replace them in the political process, is now burdened by an overload of responsibilities and a lack of organizational support.
In the past the party system has been an important mechanism for redefining the American political system and redirecting public policy. It may be, as some have suggested, that partisan politics has reached such an advanced state of decay that it cannot be raised again as an effective instrument of government. This need not be so, however, if a renewed appreciation of traditional partisanship emerges from the ashes of the American party system. In fact, the Perhaps, after all, the nationalization of politics during New Deal realignment paved the way for the transformation rather than the transcendence of the American party system. Such a possibility has been accentuated by the surge of the Republican party in recent years, which in important respects challenges the displacement of politics by administration during the New Deal and Great Society. Although the Reagan presidency fits in many respects the post-New Deal framework of enhancing the authority of the White House and executive department to the detriment to party politics, Reagan campaigned and initially governed as a party spokesman.78
Yet the disparate character of political institutions in the United States provides a precarious context for the cultivation of comprehensive party programs. Indeed, the Reagan White House, intent upon a conservative revolution, has fought to impose a comprehensive program of policy "reform" that necessarily looks beyond the limited agreements that can be worked out in the fragmented processes that give shape to American party politics. The assault on the welfare state has not entailed so much a revival of partisan politics as it has the development of a conservative administrative presidency.79 Perhaps, presidential leadership, which has greatly influenced party decline, will be directed in the future to party rejuvenation. But this will require extraordinary presidential leadership directed at lessening the influence of the White House in favor of collective responsibility. Moreover, since the rise of presidential government was connected to the achievement of policy reform, it would seem that the revival to party politics would also have to be connected to policy goals. If the Democratic coalition fashioned in the 1930s does prove to be, as the Roosevelt administration expected, the party to end all parties, then the future will not likely bring a new realignment and resurgence of partisanship. Ultimately, the future of the American political system may depend on whether or not the redefinition of the political process during the New Deal period leaves room for a new rendezvous with our political destiny. 
